Security

Security
and reports.

Here is who looks after security at Eteis and how to tell us if you find a problem in SM7.

Security lead

Beatriz Dominguez Pérez

Founder and Security Lead of Eteis (EteisNet S.A.S., Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico). Security reports go to the security lead directly.

How to report a vulnerability

Write to siete@eteis.net with the subject “Security” (or “Seguridad”). So that we can reproduce the problem, please tell us:

  • What it affects: the Android app, the iPhone app, our forwarding server or one of our websites, and the version if you know it.
  • What happens and how to reproduce it, step by step.
  • What impact you think it has.
  • How to reach you, if you would like a reply by another channel.

We acknowledge every report. Please do not include passwords, keys or other people’s data; if you need to show an example, use test accounts of your own.

Before disclosing

We ask that you do not make the problem public until we have fixed it. While you investigate, we also ask that you:

  • Do not access or modify other people’s information.
  • Do not degrade the service or run load tests.
  • Do not deceive or pressure people to obtain data.

What is covered

This policy covers SM7 (the Android and iPhone apps and the forwarding server that connects them) and Eteis’s own infrastructure, including our websites. Problems in third-party services, such as app stores, should be reported to their owners.

Published advisories

Issues we found and fixed in SM7 that have since shipped. Each one says what was fixed and since when, without details that would help anyone exploit it. All came from our own reviews.

  • SM7-2026-01 · Relay server. An unauthenticated search could hold too much memory. Fixed with size and count limits. In production since 2026-09-22.
  • SM7-2026-02 · Relay server. Backup credentials had no cap on pending items. They are now capped per account and per server. In production since 2026-09-22.
  • SM7-2026-03 · Relay server. Two backup uploads from the same account could overwrite each other. Each upload now uses its own temporary file. In production since 2026-09-22.
  • SM7-2026-04 · Relay server. The login-attempt limiter had no memory cap, and login did not require the canonical alias form. Fixed. In production since 2026-09-29.
  • SM7-2026-05 · Relay server. By default the server listened on all network interfaces. It now listens on the local machine only. In production since 2026-09-29.
  • SM7-2026-06 · Android app. After a failed login, the app retried using data from a legacy scheme. It no longer does. Fixed in version 2.8.0 on Google Play (2026-10-11).
  • SM7-2026-07 · iPhone app. When hanging up a call on a very slow network, the microphone and camera could stay on for a few seconds. They now turn off before the other side is notified. Fixed in version 1.3.0 on the App Store (2026-10-26).
  • SM7-2026-08 · Relay server. Blocking a contact did not cover one type of call alert. It now does. In production since 2026-10-22.
  • SM7-2026-09 · Relay server. When an account was deleted, the removed data could remain for a while inside the database file. It is now overwritten on deletion. In production since 2026-10-26.
  • SM7-2026-10 · Relay server. Deleting an account did not remove its backup when the key no longer had an account. It now removes it. In production since 2026-10-26.
  • SM7-2026-11 · iPhone app. Received media was decoded without a prior size limit. It is now checked first. Fixed in version 1.3.0 on the App Store (2026-10-26).
  • SM7-2026-12 · Android app. When shown in the chat, received videos went, without anyone tapping them, through a system component affected by an Android vulnerability (CVE-2026-58868). Now nothing received goes through that component without a tap. Fixed in version 2.10.0 on Google Play and on our website (2026-11-06).
  • SM7-2026-13 · Relay server. The server accepted an app declaring a new device on its own for an account that had already been transferred. It now only allows it after a recent login with that account's alias and password. In production since 2026-11-08.
  • SM7-2026-14 · Relay server. A sign-up with a public key of the wrong size could drop the connection and leave a session open until the next restart. Sign-up now requires the correct size. In production since 2026-11-09.
  • SM7-2026-15 · Relay server. An unreadable participant list in a group was stored as is and could lock the room. It is now discarded. In production since 2026-11-09.
  • SM7-2026-16 · Relay server. Stored backups had no space limit, and any key pair with a session could store one. There is now a limit, and only registered accounts can store a backup. In production since 2026-11-10.
  • SM7-2026-17 · iPhone app. A poorer backup could replace the good one, and an interrupted restore could lose the way to try again. The good one is no longer replaced without asking, and the restore can be resumed. Fixed in version 1.4.4 on the App Store (2026-11-10).

An honest reminder

No software is free of bugs. SM7 encrypts message content end to end, and we would still rather hear about anything you find. This information is also available in security.txt.